In this article we reconstruct the Frauchiger and Renner's argument [1] taking into account that the assertions of the argument are made at different times. In order to do that, we use a formalism that allows dealing with quantum properties at different times: the Theory of Consistent Histories.
I. INTRODUCTION
In April 2016, Daniela Frauchiger and Renato Renner published online an article in which they introduced a Gedankenexperiment that led them to conclude that "no singleworld interpretation can be logically consistent" [2] . In a new version of the paper, published in Nature Communications in September 2018, the authors moderate their original claim, concluding "that quantum theory cannot be extrapolated to complex systems, at least not in a straightforward manner" [1] .
Since its first online publication, the Frauchiger and Renner (F-R) argument was extensively commented in the field of quantum foundations, since it was considered as a new no-go result for quantum mechanics whose strength relies on the fact that it is neutral regarding interpretation: on the basis of three seemingly reasonable assumptions that do not include interpretive premises, the argument leads to a contradiction. This fact has been conceived as pointing to a deep shortcoming of quantum mechanics itself, which contrasts with the extraordinary success of the theory.
In a previous article [3] a careful reconstruction of the F-R argument has been offered, which shows that the contradiction resulting from the F-R argument is inferred by making classical conjunctions between different and incompatible contexts and, as a consequence, it is the result of a theoretically illegitimate inference. However, recently 1 it has been suggested that the criticism does not take into account the fact that the inferences in the F-R argument are all carefully timed, and that this fact would circumvent the objection based on the contextuality of quantum mechanics. The purpose of this article is to analyze such a defense of the F-R argument.
If timing really matters in the F-R argument, it must be reconstructed by means of a formalism that allows defining logical operations between quantum facts at different times and computing probabilities combining them, something that is not formally defined in the standard formalism . The idea of quantum histories was mainly motivated by this limitation of standard quantum mechanics. In 1984, Robert Griffiths presented the first version of his Theory of Consistent Histories [4] ; some years later, he introduced some modifications to that original version [5, 6] . Roland Omnès [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] also published a series of articles that 1 We thank Jeffrey Bub for pointing out this recent debate to us.
contributed to the development of this theory. Simultaneously, Murray Gell-Mann and James Hartle developed a similar formalism [12] [13] [14] . The Theory of Consistent Histories extends the standard formalism of quantum mechanics in order to make it capable of defining logical operations between events at different times. For this purpose, it introduces the notion of history, which generalizes the notion of event: an elemental history is defined as a sequence of events at different times, where an event is the occurrence of a property. But since it is not possible to assign probabilities to the set of all histories, it is necessary to select a subset of histories that satisfies additional conditions.
In order to analyze the defense of the F-R argument on the basis of the fact that the assertions are made at different times, we will carefully reconstruct the argument in the framework of the Theory of Consistent Histories. This task will allow us to prove that the supposedly contradictory conclusion of the argument requires computing probabilities in a family of histories that is not consistent, a move that is not legitimate in the formalism that provides us with the tools to make inferences on the basis of facts at different times.
II. THE F-R ARGUMENT
The Gedankenexperiment proposed in Frauchiger and Renner's article is a sophisticated reformulation of Wigner's friend experiment [15] . In that original thought experiment,
Wigner considers the superposition state of a particle in a closed laboratory where his friend is confined. When Wigner's friend measures the particle, the state collapses to one of its components. However, from the outside of the laboratory, Wigner still assigns a superposition state to the whole composite system: Particle + Friend + Lab. |t , where |h and |t are the eigenstates of C, and h and t are its respective eigenvalues. if the outcome is t, and sends it to F 2 .
When F 2 receives the qubit, she measures its observable S z . After these two measurements, 2 We slightly modify the original terminology for clarity.
the state of the whole system composed of the two labs is:
where
• |H and |T , eigenstates of an observable A with eigenvalues H and T , are the states of the entire lab L 1 when the outcome of F 1 's measurement is h and t, respectively,
• | ⇑ and | ⇓ , eigenstates of an observable B with eigenvalues ⇑ and ⇓, are the states of the entire lab L 2 when the outcome of F 2 's measurement is +1/2 and −1/2, respectively,
The Gedankenexperiment continues by considering two "Wigner" observers, W 1 and W 2 , located outside the labs, who will respectively measure the observables X and Y of labs L 1 and L 2 :
• X has the eigenvectors |fail X and |ok X , such that:
• Y has the eigenvectors |fail Y and |ok Y , such that:
Before analyzing the consequences of the experiment, Frauchiger and Renner point out that their argument can be conceived as a no-go theorem [1] that proves that three "naturalsounding" assumptions, (Q), (C), and (S), cannot al be valid:
Compliance with quantum theory: Quantum mechanics is universally valid, that is, it applies to systems of any complexity, including observers. Moreover, an agent knows that a given proposition is true whenever the Born rule assigns probability 1 to it.
(C) Self-consistency: Different agents' predictions are not contradictory.
(S) Single-world : From the viewpoint of an agent who carries out a particular measurement, this measurement has one single outcome.
On the basis of the above considerations -experimental setup and assumptions-the F-R argument proceeds as follows. First, in order to compute the probability that the measurements of X and Y yield the results |ok X and |ok Y , respectively, the state described by eq.
(1) must be expressed as:
From this equation, it is clear that the probability of obtaining ok X and ok Y is 1/12.
The second part of the argument consists in showing that the observers involved in the experiment can draw a conclusion different from the above one on the basis of the following reasoning. 4 Let us consider the probability that F 2 obtains −1/2 in her S z measurement and W 1 obtains |ok X in her X measurement; in order to compute this probability, the state described by eq. (1) must be expressed as:
From this equation it is easy to see that the considered probability is zero. Then, if W 1 obtains |ok X in her X measurement on Lab L 1 , she can infer that the outcome of F 2 's S z measurement on the qubit was +1/2. In turn, if F 2 obtains +1/2 in her S z measurement on the qubit, she can infer that the outcome of F 1 's C measurement on the quantum coin was 4 We thank Jeffrey Bub for suggesting us this clear explanation of this part of the argument.
The reactions to the F-R argument have been multiple and varied (see for example [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] [21] [22] , just to mention some of them). However, since the argument from which the contradiction is obtained involves quantum properties at different times, it is necessary to consider a description of the Gedankenexperiment using a theory of quantum histories. As far as we know, there has not been a detailed reconstruction of the argument in terms of the Theory of Consistent Histories. In Section IV we will offer such a description and we will draw the conclusions that the formalism offers for this case.
Moreover, the vectors |H and |T of the previous discusion are states of the measurement instrument in lab L 1 , while the vectors | ⇑ and | ⇓ are states of the measurement instrument in lab L 2 . However, the states of the measurement instruments of observers W 1 and W 2 are not included. In the next section we give a complete description of the process including the Hilbert spaces corresponding to all measurement instruments.
III. THE DIACHRONIC DEVELOPMENT OF THE ARGUMENT
Let us recall that in lab L 1 there is a quantum coin in the initial state
where H C is the Hilbert space of the coin. The initial state of the rest of lab L 1 (including observer F 1 ) is |a 0 ∈ H F 1 . Therefore, the Hilbert space of the entire lab Summing up, the Hilbert space of the entire process is
and the initial state at time t 0 is |Ψ 0 = |φ ⊗ |a 0 ⊗ |q 0 ⊗ |b 0 ⊗ |w 10 ⊗ |w 20 ∈ H.
In what follows, we describe the consecutive processes.
• Time interval (t 0 , t 1 ): Observer F 1 measures the quantum coin.
This process is represented by a unitary evolution U 10 in the Hilbert space
• Time interval (t 1 , t 2 ): Observer F 1 prepares the qubit.
This process is represented by a unitary evolution U 21 in the Hilbert space
• Time interval (t 2 , t 3 ): Observer F 2 measures the qubit This process is represented by a unitary evolution U 32 in the Hilbert space
• Time interval (t 3 , t 4 ): Observer W 1 measures lab L 1 .
This process is represented by a unitary evolution U 43 in the Hilbert space
This process is represented by a unitary evolution U 54 in the Hilbert space
Once the steps for the time evolution are stablished, the argument leading to the contradictory result, reviewed in Section II, should be written in terms of probabilities involving properties at different times. For example, in Section II the value 1/12 was obtained for the probability for obtaining ok X and ok Y . Considering the description of the time evolution
given in this section, we should write
with ∧ representing the logical conjunction. This expression is interpreted as the probability for the measurement instrument of observer W 1 to indicate w 1 ok at time t 4 and for the measurement instrument of observer W 2 to indicate w 2 ok at the later time t 5 .
The second part of the argument is based on the following conditional probabilities
If the last three conditional probabilities could be considered simultaneously, then we could infer the following conditional probability
Then, Pr [(w 2 ok , t 5 ) ∧ (w 1 fail , t 4 )] > 0, which is in contradiction with equation (11) .
Since the previous argument involves properties at different times, it is necessary a description in terms of a theory of quantum histories. In order to search for the possibility of obtaining equations (11), (12), (13) and (14) simultaneously, in the next section we will apply the Theory of Consistent Histories.
IV. THE F-R ARGUMENT IN TERMS OF QUANTUM HISTORIES
In what follows we present a brief summary of the Theory of Consistent Histories (TQH) [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] . In quantum mechanics the properties of a system are represented by orthogonal projectors. Since an elementary history is a sequence of properties at consecutive times, the TQH represents each elementary history with a tensor product of orthogonal projectors.
For example, a historyΠ = Π 1 ⊗ ... ⊗ Π n represents a sequence of properties Π 1 , ..., Π n , at times t 1 , ..., t n .
In order to define probabilities for quantum histories, it is necessary to define a family of histories. For this purpose, first we have to choose a context of properties at each time t i , i.e., a set of projectors which sum the identity of H and which are mutually orthogonal:
where I H is the identity of the Hilbert space H.
Second, we define the atomic historiesΠ k 1 ,...,kn , choosing one projector Π k i at each time
Then, we define the historiesΠ Λ summing the historiesΠ k 1 ,...,kn with (k 1 , ..., k n ) ∈ Λ ⊆σ, i.e.,
..,kn . These histories represent disjunctions of the historiesΠ k 1 ,...,kn .
Finally, the family of histories is the set obtained by making arbitrary disjunctions between product histories.
If ρ 0 is the initial state at time t 0 , the probability of a general historyΠ Λ is defined in the following way:
where we have introduced the chain operator
In general, the probability definition given in equation (16) does not satisfy the axiom of additivity. Therefore, to have a well-defined probability, the families of histories must satisfy an additional condition, called consistency condition.
In order to describe the F-R argument in terms of quantum histories, we first obtain the probability for the measurement instrument of the observer W 1 to indicate w 1 ok at time t 4
and for the measurement instrument of the observer W 2 to indicate w 2 ok at a later time t 5 .
A suitable context of properties at time t 4 should include the properties w 1 ok , w 1 fail , and has to be completed with the property ¬ (w 1 ok ∨ w 1 fail ) (where ∨ is the disjunction and ¬ is the negation). This properties are represented by the following projectors:
where each I K is the identity of the corresponding Hilbert space H K . These three projectors provide a context of properties of the Hilbert space H.
For the time t 5 , a suitable context of properties should include the properties of the measurement instrument of observer W 2 , i.e., w 1 ok , w 1 fail and has to be completed with the property ¬ (w 1 ok ∨ w 1 fail ). This properties are represented by the following projectors:
These three projectors also provide a context of properties of the Hilbert space H.
From the contexts of properties for times t 4 and t 5 we can generate a family of two-times histories, whose atomic histories areΠ k 4 ,k 5 = Π k 4 ⊗ Π k 5 , with Π k 4 one of the projectors of equations (18) and Π k 5 one of the projectors of equations (19) . It is easy to verify that the family generated by these atomic histories satisfies the consistency conditions given in equation (17) . Therefore, equation (16) can be used to compute
This shows that using the Theory of Consistent Histories, and explicitly considering the measurement instruments as quantum systems, we reobtain the same result given in Section III for the first part of the argument.
In the same way, different consistent families of two-times histories can be defined to deduce equations (12), (13) and (14) . However, if the three equations are going to be used together in the same argument, it is necessary to have a consistent family of four-times histories including the possible results of the instrument of the observer F 1 at time t 1 , the possible results of the instrument of the observer F 2 at time t 3 , the possible results of the instrument of observer W 1 at time t 4 , and the possible results of the instrument of observer W 2 at time t 5 . But such a family of histories does not satisfied the consistency conditions, given in equation (17) .
To prove this statement, let us consider two historiesΠ α andΠ β , representing different results for the four measurements, and with the following chain operators
and
Considering the unitary time evolution of the complete quantum system and the initial state defined in equation (7), we obtain
and therefore, according with equation (17), the consistency condition gives
This proves that the historiesΠ α andΠ β do not satisfy the consistency condition and, therefore, there is no family of consistent histories to describe the results of the four measurement instruments of the F-R experiment.
Summing up, since the conclusion of the second part of the F-R argument is based on an illegitimate inference, the supposed contradiction of the F-R argument does not hold.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In a previous article [3] one of us argued that the contradiction resulting from the F-R argument is inferred by making classical conjunctions between different and incompatible contexts and, as a consequence, it is the result of a theoretically illegitimate inference.
However, it has been suggested that the criticism does not take into account the fact that the inferences in the F-R argument are all carefully timed, and this fact would circumvent the objection based on the contextuality of quantum mechanics. In the present article we have shown that, if timing really matters in the F-R argument, then it must be reconstructed by means of a formalism that allows dealing with quantum properties at different times, something that is not formally defined in the standard formalism.
In order to deal with arguments with quantum properties at different times, we applied the Theory of Consistent Histories, and we showed that the contradiction resulting from
